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Honorable Frank L. Kurtz  
Chapter 11  
Hearing Date: May 8, 2019  
Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.

5 William W. Kannel (*Pro Hac* Application to be Filed)  
6 Ian A. Hammel (*Pro Hac* Application to be Filed)  
7 Timothy J. McKeon (*Pro Hac* Application to be Filed)  
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11 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
12 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

13 In re  
14 ASTRIA HEALTH, *et al.*,  
15 Debtor.

Case No. 19-01189-FLK11

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO  
DEBTORS' MOTION FOR INTERIM  
AND FINAL ORDERS  
AUTHORIZING POST-PETITION  
FINANCING, USE OF CASH  
COLLATERAL AND RELATED  
RELIEF

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20 UMB Bank, N.A., as indenture trustee under the Bond Indenture and related  
21 documents described herein (the "Bond Trustee"), and Lapis Advisers, LP, as agent  
22 under the Credit Agreement and related documents described herein ("Term Loan  
23 Agent" and together with the Bond Trustee, the "Lenders") hereby submit  
24 preliminary objections to certain relief requested and otherwise contemplated by the  
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1 “Emergency Motion of Debtors for Interim and Final Orders (i) Authorizing the  
2 Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing; (ii) Granting Security Interests and  
3 Superpriority Administrative Expense Status; (iii) Granting Adequate Protection to  
4 Certain Prepetition Secured Credit Parties; (iv) Modifying the Automatic Stay; (v)  
5 Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into Agreements with JMB Capital Partners  
6 Lending, LLC; (vi) Authorizing use of Cash Collateral; (vii) Scheduling a Final  
7 Hearing; and (viii) Granting Related Relief” [Docket No. 15] (the “Financing  
8 Motion”).

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12 The Debtors’ proposed Financing Motion and the loan terms set forth therein  
13 (the “Proposed Loan”) cannot be approved on either an interim or final basis without  
14 significant changes. To be clear, the Lenders support the Debtors’ efforts to remain  
15 a going concern, pending a disposition of their assets, and support the Debtors’  
16 efforts to ensure liquidity for post-filing operating costs. The Lenders also  
17 acknowledge those efforts may require a borrowing in these cases as part of an  
18 orderly transition into the chapter 11 process, though on terms other than the  
19 Proposed Loan. Further, the Lenders are willing to consent to interim relief on the  
20 Financing Motion, with the limitations reflected below, and on terms that reserve,  
21 and defer for later resolution, certain disputed features of the Proposed Loan. It  
22 should be equally clear under all circumstances that the Financing Motion, a  
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1 cornerstone pleading in the Debtors' risky standalone restructuring plans, is not  
2 credible and not supportable on its present terms given, among other problems, the  
3 Debtors' longstanding financial distress, the Debtors' current and anticipated cash  
4 flow projections, the resources available to the Debtors' rented management team,  
5 and the Debtors' history of system integration issues.  
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### 8 **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

9 The Lenders comprise more than two-thirds of the Debtors' nearly \$75 million  
10 of secured funded debt in these proceedings (the "Chapter 11 Cases"). The Lenders  
11 do not consent to the Financing Motion, the Proposed Loan or the relief  
12 contemplated thereby.  
13

14 As described more fully below, the Debtors have through their "first day"  
15 pleadings presented the Chapter 11 Cases as a routine business restructuring. The  
16 Debtors' storyline depicts an upstart hospital system victimized by the botched roll  
17 out of a critical hospital billing and collection system in the second year of its  
18 integration process. Under the Debtors' storyline, a quick detour into chapter 11 is  
19 all they need; they assert that the Debtors will quickly oust the vendor that supplied  
20 the defective billing and collection system, "right the ship" by installing a  
21 replacement, and continue forward as a standalone business. *See Financing Motion*  
22 *at p. 35-36.* There is no dispute that the current billing and collection system does  
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1 not work and has caused material financial harm. But it is hard to overstate the  
2 extraordinary and unacceptable risks the Debtors' strategy would impose on the  
3 Lenders and other stakeholders in these cases.  
4

5 There should be significant concern by the Court and all stakeholders whether  
6 the Debtors possess the needed resources to implement the Debtors' standalone  
7 turnaround strategy. The Debtors and their rented managers (who stand to lose a  
8 lucrative management deal and opportunities to sell other services to the Debtors if  
9 the Chapter 11 Cases are not resolved through a standalone plan) would pin all of  
10 the enterprise risks of these cases on the Lenders and other creditors. The Debtors  
11 have already spent ten months and significant resources implementing their current  
12 billing and collection system. This experience alone raises significant doubt over  
13 the Debtors' promises of a timely, successful correction. More concerning, the  
14 Debtors' financial and other issues are longstanding; the Debtors have been in a non-  
15 stop turnaround mode for two years and the Chapter 11 Cases are only the latest in  
16 a series of challenges, many of them ongoing, that have hampered the Debtors'  
17 business during their entire tenure as a hospital system.  
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23 The Debtors' Yakima and Toppenish facilities were already losing millions  
24 on an annual basis when the Debtors' system was created by Sunnyside Community  
25 Hospital's 2017 acquisition of Yakima-based Yakima Regional Medical and Cardiac  
26

1 Center and Toppenish-based Toppenish Community Hospital. The Debtors' entire  
2 history as a health care system since that acquisition has been plagued by integration  
3 challenges, persistent financial losses at the Yakima and Toppenish facilities, failed  
4 revenue enhancement and business initiatives, turnover at senior management,  
5 material deviations between management financial projections and actual financial  
6 results, and accounting snafus. The Debtors' track record belies the Debtors'  
7 storyline as to their prospects for recovery and the timing that will be needed if  
8 recovery is possible. There are other undercurrents that bear on the path forward  
9 that should be used in these cases. The Tennessee-based supplier of the Debtors'  
10 rental management team will lose a lucrative management deal if the Debtors pursue  
11 a sale strategy in the Chapter 11 Cases. That management team has selected the  
12 Tennessee-vendor's own billing and collection product as the proposed replacement  
13 vendor for the Debtors' billing and collection system. As announced in the  
14 Financing Motion, management intends to hire still others from the Tennessee  
15 organization to collect outstanding old accounts receivable. *Financing Motion at p.*  
16 *36.*

22  
23 Given all of the forgoing the Debtors must pursue an "all options" strategy  
24 that explores the sale of their assets, a business combination with a partner with  
25 deeper resources, and the refinancing of the Lenders' debt, in addition to the  
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1 Debtors' standalone preference. It is of course plausible the Debtors' health system  
2 can be viable with proper management, proper resources, proper integration, a  
3 proper roll out of revenue enhancement initiatives, and patience. But the Debtors'  
4 current plans to pursue only one of the available strategies is prejudicial to the  
5 Lenders and other stakeholders in view of the scale and scope of the process entailed,  
6 the significant evidence that the Debtors' path forward will be punctuated by many  
7 challenges and may not be successful, and the appearance of if not actual conflicts  
8 of interest.

9 While it is evident the Financing Motion is flawed based on its central role in  
10 implementing the Debtors' perilous endgame strategy for these cases, the Financing  
11 Motion is also deficient for numerous other reasons. In addition to mandating an  
12 "all options" strategy now, any relief on the Financing Motion must be further  
13 conditioned to mitigate the following problems:

- 14 • The Debtors want to supersize the Proposed Loan so they can  
15 immediately cash out \$22 million of other secured funded debt using  
16 expensive, debtor in possession financing;
- 17 • The Debtors have not established the Lenders' interests can be  
18 adequately protected if the Financing Motion is allowed;
- 19 • The adequate protection the Debtors have offered omits numerous  
20 typical, customary forms of adequate protection relief. Even if the  
21 Lenders' interests can be adequately protected under the Financing  
22 Motion, those offered terms do not satisfy the Debtors' adequate  
23 protection obligations; and

- 1
- 2       •     The Debtors have not established that they conducted any meaningful
- 3             search for debtor-in-possession financing and not established that the
- 4             proposed relief sought in the Financing Motion is in the best interests
- of the Debtors, their estates, the Lenders, or other stakeholders.

5     In short, the Financing Motion goes far beyond what is necessary, what is

6     appropriate, or what is permitted by the federal Bankruptcy Code and other

7     applicable law in support of the Debtors' intended plans.

8             For now, the Lenders are willing to consent to tailored interim relief on the

9     Financing Motion that maintains the *status quo*, and that permits the parties time to

10    evaluate the issues that surround the Financing Motion in advance of any further

11    interim hearing or any final hearing. For purposes of an initial hearing on the

12    Financing Motion, the Lenders are specifically willing to consent to relief with the

13    following attributes:

- 14       •     Limited borrowing under an agreed short term budget to support
- 15             postpetition ordinary course operating costs pending a further interim
- 16             or final hearing;
- 17       •     An agreement (or requirement) to defer any borrowing under the
- 18             Proposed Loan that would repay any prepetition secured funded debt at
- 19             this time;
- 20       •     Adequate protection terms that are customary in hospital chapter 11
- 21             cases and are necessary given the Debtors' planned priming of the
- 22             Lenders and planned use of their collateral, as detailed below;
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- A good faith commitment by the Lenders and Debtors to discuss the go-forward process in these cases before the next hearing on the Financing Motion; and
- A full reservation of all rights of the Lenders and Debtors as to the Financing Motion and the Proposed Loan on any unresolved positions pending a further interim hearing or final hearing on the Financing Motion.

Any other relief on the Financing Motion should be denied at this stage.

## **BACKGROUND**

### **The Posture of These Cases**

The Chapter 11 Cases follow a severe disruption of the Debtors' "revenue cycle" – the lifeblood process the Debtors (and hospitals generally) use to bill for services and collect revenue from insurance companies, government agencies like Medicare, patients and others. *See Financing Motion at p. 35-36.* The Debtors blame this disruption on the botched 2018 roll out of a new billing and collection system. *Id.* The Debtors assert that the corrective path forward in these cases is clear-cut:

**First**, the Debtors will dump the vendor that supplied this malfunctioning revenue system in favor of a replacement product. The Debtors' preferred replacement product is offered by the Tennessee company that also manages the Debtors' hospitals;

**Second**, the Debtors will quickly implement that replacement product, and



1 will in short order build needed cash-flow; and

2 ***Third***, the Debtors will restructure as a standalone health care enterprise.

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4 *Id. at 35 - 36.* The Debtors assert this fix can be implemented on a schedule that will  
5 permit them to propose a standalone restructuring in 120 days or less, and the  
6 Debtors promise to pursue an “alternative transaction” only if they are unable to  
7 achieve these goals. *Id*

8  
9 The Debtors’ case storyline is a carbon copy of the same business plan and  
10 strategy the Debtors peddled to the Lenders when the Working Capital Loan was  
11 advanced in January 2019. The Debtors broke their early 2019 promises to quickly  
12 correct their billing and collection process (and their acknowledgement that  
13 “alternative transactions” would be required if they continued to struggle). The  
14 Debtors’ recycled promises to implement the same plan now in the Chapter 11 Cases  
15 are not credible.  
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18 The Debtors’ conduct in the period running up to these cases demonstrates, if  
19 anything, that healthcare revenue cycle management is complex, that new revenue  
20 cycle programs are time consuming to implement and fraught with risk, and that  
21 these critical operational matters can difficult to manage, and easily broken.  
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24 The Lenders have worked cooperatively with the Debtors and their  
25 management team through the prepetition turnaround efforts, as evidenced by the  
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Working Capital Loan, which is all of 4 months old.

**The Debtors' Secured Funded Debt**

The Bonds and the Working Capital Loan are two of the Debtors' four primary secured funded debt obligations and represent more than two-thirds of the Debtors' secured funded debt. As of the petition date in these cases, the Debtors' primary secured funded debt obligations are as follows:

<b><i>Obligation:</i></b>	<b><i>Approximate Claim Amount:</i></b>
Bonds:	\$36,732,417
Working Capital Loan:	\$10,477,534
Banner Loans:	\$10,600,000*
MidCap Loans:	\$10,700,000*
Total:	\$68,509,951*

The Financing Motion also references an equipment financing transaction with GE HFS, LLC in the amount of approximately \$5 million. This boosts total secured

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\* These numbers are based on information reflected in the Financing Motion.

1 funded debt to nearly \$75 million. *See Financing Motion at p. 9.*

2       The Bonds were issued pursuant to that certain Bond Indenture dated as of  
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4 November 1, 2017 (the “Bond Indenture”) between the Washington Health Care  
5 Facilities Authority (the “Authority”) and UMB Bank, N.A., as trustee (the  
6 “Trustee”). Under the Bond Indenture, a related Loan and Security Agreement dated  
7  
8 as of November 1, 2017 between the Authority and Debtors Astria Health, SHC  
9 HoldCo, LLC, SHC Medical Center – Yakima and SHC Medical Center –  
10 Toppenish, and other documents that evidence and secure the Bonds (each a “Bond  
11 Document”), proceeds from the Bonds were loaned to Debtors Astria Health, SHC  
12 HoldCo, LLC, SHC Medical Center – Yakima and SHC Medical Center – Toppenish  
13 and those borrowers covenanted to repay those loans to the Trustee for application  
14  
15 under the Bond Documents. The remaining Debtors have guaranteed payment of  
16  
17 the Bonds.

18       The Debtors’ obligations under the Bonds and Bond Documents are secured  
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20 by all of the Debtors’ assets, including the real property and improvements that  
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22 comprise the Debtors’ hospital and other facilities, accounts, chattel paper,  
23 documents, general intangibles, goods, inventory, equipment, instruments, monies,  
24 books, records, and proceeds (collectively, the “Bond Collateral”). The Debtors’  
25 obligations on the Bonds secured by the Bond Collateral include, as of the Petition  
26

1 Date: (i) unpaid principal on the Bonds in the amount of \$35,400,000; (ii) accrued  
2 but unpaid interest on the Bonds in the amount of \$1,332,417; and (iii) accrued and  
3 unpaid fees and expenses of the Bond Trustee, including professional fees (the  
4 “Bond Claims”).  
5

6 The Working Capital Loan was issued pursuant to that certain Credit  
7 Agreement dated as of January 18, 2019 (the “Credit Agreement”), between certain  
8 of the Debtors, Lapis Advisers, LP (the “Agent”) and others. Under the Credit  
9 Agreement and other documents that evidence and secure the Working Capital Loan  
10 (each a “Working Capital Loan Document”), proceeds from the Working Capital  
11 Loan were loaned to Debtors Astria Health, Sunnyside Community Hospital  
12 Association, Sunnyside Professional Services, LLC, Sunnyside Community  
13 Hospital Home Medical Supply, LLC, Sunnyside Home Health, Kitchen and Bath  
14 Furnishings, LLC, Oxbow Summit, LLC, and non-debtors Sunnyside Hospital  
15 Service Corp., Sunnyside Medical Center, LLC, Depot Plus, LLC, Bridal Dreams,  
16 LLC, Pacific Northwest ASC Management, LLC, Northwest Health, LLC, Kitchen  
17 Appliances, LLC, Home Supply, LLC and Wedded Bliss, LLC and those borrowers  
18 covenanted to repay those loans to the Agent for application under the Working  
19 Capital Loan Documents. The remaining Debtors have guaranteed payment and  
20 performance of the Working Capital Loan.  
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1 The Working Capital Loan Documents are secured by all of the Debtors’  
2 assets, including the real property and improvements that comprise the Debtors’  
3 hospital and other facilities, accounts, chattel paper, documents, general intangibles,  
4 goods, inventory, equipment, instruments, monies, books, records, and proceeds  
5 (collectively, the “Working Capital Loan Collateral”). The Debtors’ obligations on  
6 the Working Capital Loan secured by the Working Capital Loan Collateral include,  
7 as of the Petition Date: (i) unpaid principal on the Working Capital Loan in the  
8 amount of \$10,000,000; (ii) accrued but unpaid interest on the Working Capital Loan  
9 in the amount of \$477,534; and (iii) accrued and unpaid fees and expenses of Agent,  
10 including professional fees (the “Working Capital Loan Claims”).  
11

### 12 **The Financing Motion and Proposed Loan**

13 The Financing Motion, one of the Debtors’ “first day pleadings”, seeks  
14 authority to borrow \$36 million under a “*Senior Secured, Super-Priority Debtor-in-*  
15 *Possession Loan and Security Agreement*” (the “DIP Credit Agreement”) from JMB  
16 Capital Partners Lending, LLC (the “DIP Lender”). The effective cost of the  
17 proposed loans exceeds 20 percent interest, including 12 percent interest on the loan  
18 balance, a 1.5 percent commitment fee, a 1.5 percent funding fee, and a 5 percent  
19 exit fee. The Proposed Loan includes an additional 10 percent penalty if the loan is  
20 not paid in full on or before December 31, 2019. In support of the Financing Motion,  
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1 the Debtors filed the “*Declaration of Michael Lane in Support of Emergency Motion*  
2 *of Debtors for Interim and Final Orders (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain*  
3 *Postpetition Financing; (ii) Granting Security Interests and Superpriority*  
4 *Administrative Expense Status; (iii) Granting Adequate Protection to Certain*  
5 *Prepetition Secured Credit Parties; (iv) Modifying the Automatic Stay; (v)*  
6 *Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into Agreements with JMB Capital Partners*  
7 *Lending, LLC; (vi) Authorizing use of Cash Collateral; (vii) Scheduling a Final*  
8 *Hearing; and (viii) Granting Related Relief*” [Docket No. 16] (the “Lane  
9 Declaration”).

13 The Debtors seek authority to borrow \$28 million at the interim, first day  
14 hearing on the Financing Motion. The Financing Motion contemplates expansive  
15 liens on substantially all of the Debtors’ assets, including liens that would prime the  
16 Lenders’ liens and security interests in certain Bond Collateral and Working Capital  
17 Loan Collateral and cause a more than \$14 million in diminution in the value of the  
18 Bond Collateral and Working Capital Loan Collateral.<sup>†</sup> Nearly two-thirds of the  
19 proposed \$36 million of borrowing would be used to roll up and cash out Banner  
20 and Midcap. The Lenders do not consent to the Financing Motion, do not consent  
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26 <sup>†</sup> This amount only reflects the increased principal amount. When the higher interest and fees are included, the amount of diminution will be more.

1 to the use or priming of their collateral on the terms proposed, and do not otherwise  
2 consent to the current terms thereof.  
3

### 4 ARGUMENT

5 The compressed nature of the first day hearing process and the overall  
6 complexity of the Proposed Loan make a comprehensive list of Financing Motion  
7 problems impractical.<sup>‡</sup> With a full reservation of all rights concerning the Financing  
8 Motion and related materials, including all rights to supplement the Lenders'  
9 preliminary objections herein in advance of or at any interim or final hearings on the  
10 Financing Motion, the Financing Motion and related materials are flawed in at least  
11 the following ways:  
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- 14 • The Debtors want to supersize the Proposed Loan so they can cash out  
15 \$22 million of other lenders' secured funded debt using expensive,  
16 debtor in possession financing terms;
- 17 • The Debtors have not established the Lenders' interests can be  
18 adequately protected if the Financing Motion is allowed on its current  
19 terms;
- 20 • The adequate protection the Debtors have offered omits numerous  
21 typical, customary forms of adequate protection relief. Even if the  
22 Lenders' interests can be adequately protected under the Financing  
23 Motion, the offered terms do not satisfy the Debtors' adequate  
24 protection obligations; and

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25 <sup>‡</sup> Absent resolution the Lenders intend to supplement these objections in advance of any further interim  
26 hearings or any final hearing on the Financing Motion.

- 1           • The Debtors have not established that they conducted any meaningful  
2           search for debtor-in-possession financing and not established that the  
3           proposed relief sought in the Financing Motion is in the best interests  
4           of the Debtors, their estates, the Lenders, or other stakeholders.

5           **A. The Court Should Limit Borrowing To Operating Cost Shortfalls And**  
6           **Reasonable Costs Of The Chapter 11 Cases**

7           Any relief on the Financing Motion should limit borrowing to postpetition  
8           operating costs and reasonable costs of the Chapter 11 Cases that cannot be satisfied  
9           using cash, investments or earnings otherwise available to the Debtors on or after  
10          the Petition Date. The Court should reject the Debtors' effort to borrow expensive  
11          funds for a "no-look" immediate \$22 million cash out to Banner Bank and MidCap.  
12

13           **The Court Should Deny the Request to Repay Banner or MidCap at the "First**  
14           **Day" Hearing**

15           The Financing Motion reflects that roughly \$22 million of the Debtors'  
16          requested \$28 million initial first-day borrowing would be used to cash out  
17          prepetition loans made by Banner and MidCap. *See Financing Motion at p. 37.* The  
18          Debtors have not satisfied and cannot satisfy Bankruptcy Rules 4001(b)(2) and  
19          4001(c)(2) in connection with this request and this relief must be denied.  
20

21           Bankruptcy Rules 4001(b)(2) and 4001(c)(2) provide that a court shall not  
22          issue an order to in connection with a cash collateral of financing motion in the first  
23          14 days of a chapter 11 proceeding. *Id.* These rules provide one narrow exception.  
24          25          26



1 *Id.* That exception requires a stiff finding that relief is “necessary to avoid immediate  
2 and irreparable harm” pending a final hearing. *Id.*  
3

4 The Debtors have not provided and cannot provide any showing that this no-  
5 look cash out is necessary to avoid “immediate and irreparable harm” and is  
6 accordingly permitted in the Chapter 11 Cases. The Debtors have instead argued  
7 that this Court should ignore these rules and recognize other “helpful to the Debtors”  
8 grounds that this relief is appropriate. The Debtors assert in the Financing Motion  
9 that this relief would:  
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- 12 (a) simplify the Debtors’ prepetition borrowing structure;
- 13 (b) reduce restrictions on the Debtors’ borrowing capabilities; and
- 14 (c) eliminate the need to determine and provide adequate protection to  
15 Banner and MidCap.

16 *Financing Motion at p. 37 - 38.*  
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18 None of these is a recognized basis for this relief at any first day hearing. This  
19 is particularly so where the Debtors have not established why the automatic stay and  
20 other the powers of this Court and the bankruptcy process would not supply other  
21 tools to address these issues in a less drastic fashion. While the Lenders dispute the  
22 Debtors’ adequate protection theories in the Financing Motion as they relate to the  
23 Lenders, it is curious how the Debtors can in the same pleading suggest that the  
24 Lenders can be readily primed and protected while Banner and MidCap should have  
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1 an entirely different outcome. The Court should reject the Debtors' efforts to ignore  
2 the longstanding limitations imposed by the bankruptcy rules.  
3

4 **The Debtors have not Shown that Paying Banner or MidCap is Otherwise Proper**

5 The Debtors have not shown that paying Banner or MidCap is otherwise  
6 proper as part of interim or final relief on the Financing Motion. The Financing  
7 Motion establishes that doing so is financially irresponsible.  
8

9 Courts routinely observe that they should only approve debtor in possession  
10 financing that is in the best interest of the general creditor body. *See, e.g., In re*  
11 *Roblin Industries, Inc.*, 52 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (debtor must  
12 demonstrate, among other things, that “[t]he proposed financing is in the best  
13 interests of the general creditor body[.]”) (quoting *In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc.*,  
14 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)). Proposed financing must be fair,  
15 reasonable and adequate. *In re Crouse Group, Inc.*, 71 B.R. 544, 546 (Bankr. E.D.  
16 Pa. 1987). When proposed debtor in possession financing involves the roll-up of  
17 prepetition funded debt, further limitations apply. DIP loan roll ups require special  
18 scrutiny. *See* Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c)(1)(B)(ii) (requiring a debtor to highlight roll-  
19 ups, if any, in a motion seeking approval of postpetition financing). They should be  
20 rejected when the amount of debt “rolled up” is disproportionate to the “new money”  
21 that is provided. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 364.06 (16th 2019).  
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1       The Debtors' cannot establish that the Proposed Loan is in the best interests  
2 of creditors or is otherwise fair or reasonable given their plans to use expensive,  
3 debtor in possession financing, to pay off the much less expensive Banner and  
4 MidCap debt.  
5

6       While the Lenders do not have full information concerning the interest rates  
7 and other pricing for the Banner and MidCap loans to the Debtors, the Lenders are  
8 informed and believe that the cost of those loans to the Debtors is significantly less  
9 than the cost of the Proposed Loan. The Lane Declaration reflects that the cost of  
10 the MidCap loans is approximately 13.25 percent, comprised of a base rate (6.35  
11 percent), a default rate (3.00 percent), a management fee (1.2 percent), a float  
12 (approximately 2.0 percent), and other fees aggregating to about 0.70 percent). *See*  
13 *Lane Declaration ¶ 15*. The Banner relationship is evidenced by several different  
14 lending arrangements, but the Lenders believe the main Banner obligation bears non-  
15 default interest at 4.3 percent when a related swap agreement is factored in. Even  
16 when default interest is added, the Lenders believe the cost of both loans is materially  
17 less than the Proposed Loan.  
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23       The Proposed Loan, in contrast, is priced at more than 20 percent annual  
24 interest, and perhaps significantly more. As noted above, the fees, costs and charges  
25 associated with the Proposed Loan include the following:  
26

- 12 percent annual interest on all amounts advanced;
- A 1.5 percent commitment fee;
- A 1.5 percent funding fee; and
- A 5 percent exit fee.

These charges total 20 percent. Since the loan matures in December, less than 9 months from now, the exit fee actually runs closer to 7 percent on an annual basis, making the cost closer to 22 percent. Further, if the Proposed Loan is not paid by December 31, 2019, an additional 10 percent “maturity date fee” would be charged. The Lenders are puzzled how the Debtors concluded, in the Financing Motion, that this the DIP Facility is cheaper than the MidCap debt. *See Financing Motion at p. 19* (so asserting). It is inconceivable that the Debtors’ proposed use of 20 percent, 22 percent or 30 percent plus money to pay off the Banner or MidCap loans is in the best interest of any creditor in these cases that is not Banner or MidCap. The Debtors’ reference to two unpublished order in the Financing Motion does not establish that this relief is appropriate in the Chapter 11 Cases. *See Financing Motion at p. 38*. Supersizing the Proposed Loan would obviously benefit the proposed DIP Lender too, who stands to earn a generous return on the roughly \$22 million increase in the Proposed Loan amount this would cause. That does not translate into a transaction that benefits creditors or other stakeholders.

1 As noted, nearly two-thirds of the Proposed Financing would be used to roll-  
2 up prepetition debt. The Financing Motion cannot be approved for this additional  
3 reason given the significant imbalance between new funds to provide liquidity in  
4 these cases versus money that will only benefit two legacy lenders.  
5

6 **B. The Debtors Have Not Established They Could Adequately Protect**  
7 **The Lenders' Interests**

8 Any relief on the Financing Motion must be conditioned since the Debtors  
9 have not shown they could provide adequate protection for the Lenders' interests in  
10 the Bond Collateral and Working Capital Loan Collateral the Debtors are seeking to  
11 use nor have the Debtors shown they could provide adequate protection for the  
12 diminution in value of the Bond Collateral and Working Capital Loan Collateral that  
13 would be caused by the Proposed Loan's priming features. Without a showing that  
14 the Debtors are positioned to supply adequate protection for the Lenders' interests,  
15 the Debtors can only proceed with the Lenders' consent. As indicated elsewhere in  
16 these preliminary objections, the Lenders are willing to provide that consent but not  
17 on the terms of the Financing Motion and only if relief on the Financing Motion is  
18 conditioned to address the issues reflected herein.  
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22

23 The Debtors have an unconditional duty to provide the Lenders adequate  
24 protection in the Chapter 11 Cases. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(e), 364(d). Bankruptcy  
25 Code Section 363(e) provides that the Court shall prohibit or condition the Debtors'  
26

1 use, sale, or lease of the Lenders' collateral, including cash collateral, to provide  
2 adequate protection of the Lenders' interests. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). Section  
3  
4 364(d)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code is even plainer: there can be no 'superpriority'  
5 lien unless "there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the [prior]  
6 lien . . . ." *See* 11 U.S.C. § 363(d). Courts have uniformly affirmed that adequate  
7 protection is not a discretionary act. *See In re T.M. Sweeney & Sons LTL Servs.,*  
8 *Inc.*, 131 B.R. 984, 990 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); *Metromedia Fiber Network Servs.*  
9 *v. Lexent, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network Servs., Inc.)*, 290 B.R. 487, 491  
10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (adequate protection is not permissive or discretionary).  
11

12  
13 The Debtors bear the burden to show that adequate protection is present. *See*  
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(p), 364(d)(2) (providing that the debtor "has the burden of proof  
15 on the issue of adequate protection"); *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sonora Desert*  
16 *Dairy, L.L.C. (In re Sonora Desert Dairy, L.L.C.)*, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 18, at \*30-  
17 31 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2015); *see also In re Plabell Rubber Prods., Inc.*, 137  
18 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) ("Section 36[4](d)(1)(B) requires the  
19 movant to prove that the lender who is subject to being primed will be adequately  
20 protected in the face of the loan transaction"). The Debtors can only meet their  
21 adequate protection burden by showing on a "firm evidentiary basis" that the  
22 Lenders' liens will be adequately protected from the decrease in value that will be  
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1 caused if the Debtors impose the requested priming liens and use their collateral as  
2 requested in the Chapter 11 Cases. *See In re Windsor Hotel, L.L.C.*, 295 B.R. 307,  
3 314 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003).

4  
5 Adequate protection in the Chapter 11 Cases must preserve the *status quo* for  
6 affected secured creditors. *See In re 354 E. 66<sup>th</sup> St. Realty Corp.*, 177 B.R. 776, 781-  
7 782 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that the purpose of adequate protection  
8 payments was to preserve the *status quo* for a secured creditor); *see also Associates*  
9 *Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash)*, 90 F.3d 1036, 1050 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1996),  
10 *rev'd on other grounds*, 520 U.S. 953 (1997) (“The adequate protection provisions .  
11 . . were included in the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, reflecting a few prior decisions in  
12 the case law that sought to protect secured creditors from a decline in the value of  
13 the collateral during the pendency of the stay”).

14  
15 The Debtors’ showing must establish verifiable compensation to the Lenders  
16 to offset the decline in the Lenders’ collateral position that would be caused by the  
17 use and priming of the Bond Collateral and Working Capital Loan Collateral that is  
18 contemplated here. *See Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc. (In re*  
19 *Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc.)*, 16 F.3d 552, 567 (3d Cir. 1994); *see also In re St.*  
20 *Petersburg Hotel Assocs., Ltd.*, 44 B.R. 944, 946 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (denying  
21 motion to incur financing on a priming basis, observing that “to permit the Debtor  
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1 to saddle this property with an additional encumbrance which is superior to the  
2 interest of the Mortgagee would clearly operate to further deteriorate the position of  
3 the Mortgagee”); *In re Windsor Hotel, LLC*, 295 B.R. 307, 314 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.  
4 2003) (denying request to incur financing on a priming basis; “Where the debtor  
5 proposes a priming lien, the proposal should provide the prepetition secured creditor  
6 with the same level of protection it would have had if there had not been post-petition  
7 superpriority financing”); *In re Martin*, 761 F.2d 472, 474 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The  
8 concept of adequate protection was designed to insure that the secured creditor  
9 receives the value for which he bargained”) (internal quotation marks omitted); *In*  
10 *re Buttermilk Towne Center, LLC*, 442 B.R. 558, 566 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2010) (finding  
11 no adequate protection for use of cash collateral where “the record does not indicate  
12 that Debtor possesses any unencumbered asset with which it can offer ... adequate  
13 protection”) (citations omitted); *Suntrust Bank v. Den-Mark Constr., Inc.*, 406 B.R.  
14 683, 702 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (holding that the pre-petition secured creditor’s interest  
15 was not adequately protected by the debtor’s continued operations).

16  
17 The only showing the Debtors have made in the Financing Motion in the face  
18 of these requirements is that the Debtors’ requested priming liens would  
19 significantly diminish the Lenders’ existing secured property interests. If the  
20 Debtors were permitted to borrow the full \$36 million described in the Financing  
21



1 Motion, the Proposed Loan would layer more than \$14 million of new secured debt  
2 ahead of the Lenders once \$22 million of the Proposed Loan was used to retire debt  
3 that, subject to a lien and claim review, may already have lien priority over the  
4 Lenders' claims.  
5

6 What the Debtors have not established and what the Financing Motion does  
7 not demonstrate is any "firm evidentiary basis" to conclude that the Debtors have  
8 the resources to provide the required adequate protection for the Lenders' interests.  
9 There is no indication for example that the Debtors have unencumbered assets that  
10 can be pledged as additional collateral. There is no indication that available proceeds  
11 from any sale or other disposition of the Debtors' assets would clear both the  
12 Proposed Loan and the Lenders' claims.  
13  
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15

16 There is no "firm evidentiary basis" to support Debtors' "equity cushion  
17 argument". A key feature of the Debtors' adequate protection argument is the  
18 Debtors' assertions that there is a sufficient existing equity cushion. *See Financing*  
19 *Motion at p. 47.* This argument rests on unsustainable "book value" and "enterprise  
20 value" claims. As an initial matter, the Debtors' assertions are inscrutable. The  
21 *Lane Declaration* refers to a "revenue multiplier of .7 times EBIDTA". *Lane*  
22 *Declaration at p. 32.* To the Lenders' knowledge this is not even a recognized  
23 method for establishing enterprise value. The Lenders' were unable to ascertain how  
24  
25  
26

1 the Debtors conclude that the enterprise value of the Sunnyside assets is  
2 approximately \$84 million even using the other information Mr. Lane describes.  
3  
4 The Debtors have not provided sufficient disclosures to even validate the alleged  
5 \$200 million book value amount. Information previously disclosed to the Lenders  
6 suggests a much lower book value amount. Further, the Debtors seemingly use one  
7 enterprise valuation method for the Sunnyside assets (.7xs alleged EBITDA) and  
8 another for the Yakima and Toppenish assets (40 percent of alleged revenues). The  
9 Debtors' pick and choose approach in selecting methods that assigns one valuation  
10 method to the Sunnyside assets and another to the Yakima and Toppenish facilities  
11 is more a sign that the Debtors have embraced a "win at all costs" strategy on the  
12 Financing Motion than good faith attempt to assign value to the Debtors' assets.  
13  
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15

16 There is not otherwise a sufficient evidentiary basis to find that the alleged  
17 *book value* of the Debtors' assets establishes the Debtors' capacity to protect the  
18 Lenders' interests in these cases. Bankruptcy courts consistently use fair market  
19 value or forced liquidation value when valuation issues arise. *See, e.g., In re Ralar*  
20 *Distribs., Inc.*, 166 B.R. 3, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) ("The value relevant for  
21 adequate protection purposes, however, is not book value. It is liquidation value  
22 realizable by the creditor"); *United States v. Case (In re Case)*, 115 B.R. 666, 670  
23 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) ("If we were attempting to value [secured creditor's] interest  
24  
25  
26

1 in the property for adequate protection purposes, the possibility of forced liquidation  
2 would be assumed and a deduction for selling costs would be logical”). In these  
3 cases, any explainable book value is particularly inaccurate since the Debtors are  
4 relying on interim, not audited, financials.  
5

6         The Debtors’ “back of the envelope” enterprise value assertions should fare  
7 no better. The Lenders are informed and therefore believe that hospital valuation is  
8 a nuanced process that depends on multiple factors, including payor mix, the  
9 condition of the physical assets, the services that are provided, market share and  
10 numerous other factors. The Lenders are familiar with other hospital restructuring  
11 matters where enterprise values have been pegged at one third or less of net patient  
12 service revenues, and sometimes less. The Lenders believe there may well be  
13 reasons to believe a stronger outcome is possible if the Debtors’ assets are properly  
14 marketed in the Chapter 11 Cases by qualified and acceptable investment bankers.  
15 But a “one third” valuation model would reflect an enterprise value of roughly \$80  
16 million. With roughly \$77 million of secured funded debt on the Debtors’ books  
17 already, there is no equity cushion here.  
18

19         By the Debtors’ own admission, the Debtors’ proposed replacement liens and  
20 superpriority claims that are the primary alternative form of alleged adequate  
21 protection cannot not offer the Lenders additional value which might constitute  
22

1 adequate protection. A key premise behind the Debtors' assertions that they can  
2 only get financing that offers the DIP Lender priming liens is the Debtors' assertion  
3 that substantially all of their existing assets are already subject to liens. *See*  
4 *Financing Motion at p. 43*. The Debtors cannot provide adequate protection by  
5 granting "replacement liens" on property that is already encumbered by the Lenders'  
6 prepetition security interests. *See In re Buttermilk Towne Center*, 442 B.R. at 566-  
7 57.

8  
9  
10 There is not an appropriate record to establish that the Lenders would receive  
11 verifiable compensation, and thus be adequately protected as is required. At a  
12 minimum, further proceedings, with discovery, expert analysis and fundamental due  
13 process is needed before any relief should be granted on the basis of these claims.  
14  
15

16 **C. The Adequate Protection That Has Been Offered Does Not Satisfy The**  
17 **Debtors' Adequate Protection Obligations**

18 Even if the Debtors could establish that adequate protection of the Lenders'  
19 interests is possible in the Chapter 11 Cases, the Debtors have not offered adequate  
20 protection terms that do so. Any relief on the Financing Motion must be conditioned  
21 on terms that implement an "all options" strategy and provide the Lenders'  
22 customary adequate protection terms that are missing from the Financing Motion.  
23

24 **The Debtors Must Implement an "All Options" Strategy**

25  
26 The Debtors must pursue an "all options" strategy now that explores the sale

1 of their assets, a business combination with a partner with deeper resources, and the  
2 refinancing of the Lenders' debt, in addition to the Debtors' standalone preference.  
3  
4 An "all options" strategy is necessary to adequately protect the Lenders and relief  
5 on the Financing Motion should be conditioned on an obligation to proceed in that  
6 manner.  
7

8 The Debtors' business strategy for these cases is risky and the management  
9 team track record does not support their "one option" standalone strategy. As noted,  
10 the Debtors can only meet their adequate protection burden by showing on a "firm  
11 evidentiary basis" that the Lenders' liens will be adequately protected from the  
12 decrease in value that will be caused if the Debtors impose the requested priming  
13 liens and use their collateral as requested in the Chapter 11 Cases. *See In re Windsor*  
14 *Hotel, L.L.C.*, 295 B.R. 307, 314 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003); *see also In re Mosello*, 195  
15 B.R. 277, 292 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[A]dequate protection should be premised  
16 on facts, or on projections grounded in a firm evidentiary basis"); *In re First South*  
17 *Sav. Ass'n*, 820 F.2d 700, 710 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Given the fact that super priority  
18 financing displaces liens on which creditors have relied in extending credit, a court  
19 that is asked to authorize such financing must be particularly cautious when  
20 assessing whether the creditors so displaced are adequately protected"). The  
21 Debtors' storyline of these cases does not meet that standard.  
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1 The Debtors cannot establish a firm evidentiary basis to move ahead on their  
2 requested terms when they have encountered successive challenges that have  
3 impeded the system in multiple, and significant ways for years. The Debtors have  
4 encountered numerous episodic issues that have caused material economic distress.  
5 The Debtors, for example, rolled out a poorly implemented IT system update in  
6 2018. That roll out disrupted the Debtors' business and reduced patient volume by  
7 roughly 30 percent for weeks. As a further recent example, in the fall of 2018, the  
8 Debtors determined that several months of interim financial statements included  
9 massive errors. Many other challenges have been more persistent: The Yakima and  
10 Toppenish facilities were losing money when they were acquired to form the system  
11 in 2017. Since then, those financial losses have continued. Further, the Debtors  
12 have attempted numerous revenue enhancement and cost containment initiatives that  
13 have failed. The Debtors have experienced significant turnover in senior  
14 management, including at least two CEOs and two CFOs for the Yakima facility,  
15 the largest of the Debtors' three acute care hospitals. It is conceivable this revolving  
16 door will continue since at least some of the Debtors current management team is  
17 "rented" from a third-party vendor, HealthTechS3 based in Brentwood, Tennessee.  
18 Even before the Debtors' commenced their ill-fated transition to their present billing  
19 and collection program, the Debtors were in covenant default on the Bonds over  
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1 multiple fiscal quarters. During this two-year period, management presented  
2 successive financial projections but actual results have consistently underperformed.  
3

4 It is of course plausible the Debtors' health system can be viable with proper  
5 management, proper resources, proper integration, a proper roll out of revenue  
6 enhancement initiatives, and patience. But the Debtors' insistence that it only one  
7 of the available strategies is prejudicial to the Lenders and fails to adequately protect  
8 their interests in view of the scale and scope of the reclamation project ahead and  
9 the significant evidence that the Debtors' path forward will be punctuated by many  
10 challenges and potential inherent conflicts.  
11  
12

13 **The Proposed Adequate Protection is Otherwise Deficient**  
14

15 The Court should otherwise reject the Debtors' adequate protection "package"  
16 which is anchored in a hodgepodge of adequate protection arguments that provide  
17 not real protections and replacement liens in the same assets that are already pledged  
18 to the Lenders.  
19

20 The Debtors have provided a series of empty assertions in their adequate  
21 protection "package". The adequate protection assertions include (i) the suspect  
22 equity cushion argument already addressed, (ii) that the Lenders are protected since  
23 the priority of their liens will not be materially affected, (iii) that the Lenders will be  
24 protected since the Debtors plan to comply with a budget over which the Lenders  
25  
26

1 have not control, and (iv) that the Lenders will be protected so long as the Debtors  
2 remain a going concern. The Debtors then supplement these assertions with  
3  
4 proposed:

- 5 • Replacement liens in postpetition assets that would otherwise constitute  
6 the Lenders' collateral;
- 7 • Superpriority claims in some, though not all, of the Debtors' assets; and
- 8 • The same financial reporting the Debtors have agreed to provide to the  
9 DIP Lender.

10  
11 *Financing Motion at p. 38-39, 46-48.*

12 The Debtors' "adequate protection assertions" are incorrect. Adequate  
13 protection is the Lenders' "fundamental right" in the Chapter 11 Cases. *In re Waste*  
14 *Conversion Techs., Inc.* 205 B.R. 1004, 1007 (D. Conn. 1997). For the reasons  
15 already stated, the Lenders cannot rely on their discredited equity cushion argument.  
16 The Debtors' argument that the Lenders are adequately protected since the DIP  
17 Lender's proposed liens will not change the priority of the Lenders' liens is insulting  
18 when the Financing Motion seeks to increase the Debtors' debt load by more than  
19 \$14 million and the Proposed Loan calls for a significant increase over the borrowing  
20 costs that are associated with the Banner and Midcap loans that would be refinanced  
21 under the Debtors' desired result. It is unclear how the Debtors' agreement to  
22 comply with a budget that the Lenders do not have rights to control provides any  
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1 verifiable protection for the Lenders' interests. The Debtors' suggestion that the  
2 continuation of the Debtors' business is sufficient; that is not what the law requires  
3  
4 when there is priming debtor in possession financing, as proposed in the Chapter 11  
5 Cases. The law requires verifiable compensation to the Lenders under the proposed  
6 adequate protection package to offset the decline in the Lenders' collateral position  
7  
8 that would be caused by the priming that is contemplated here. *See Resolution Tr.*  
9 *Corp. v. Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc. (In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc.)*, 16 F.3d  
10 552, 567 (3d Cir. 1994).  
11

12 The offered adequate protection terms are also deficient. A postpetition  
13 financing proposal "should provide the prepetition secured creditor with the same  
14 level of protection it would have had if there had not been post-petition superpriority  
15 financing. *Id.* As noted above, the replacement liens and superpriority claims are  
16 illusory. Likewise, the financial reporting the Debtors have offered to provide under  
17 the Financing Motion adds nothing to the Lenders' existing rights under the Bond  
18 Documents and Working Capital Loan Documents, which already include rights to  
19 financial and other information regarding the Facility that the Secured Parties' may  
20 reasonably request. *See e.g.* Loan and Security Agreement at Section 7.2.  
21  
22  
23

24 The Debtors are inviting this Court to ignore the required standards, ignore  
25 the "extraordinary" nature of the remedy they are seeking, and ignore the accepted  
26

1 notion that these features may only be granted under the “most compelling and  
2 extraordinary circumstances.” *In re Dunckle Assocs., Inc.*, 19 B.R. 481, 485 (Bankr.  
3 E.D. Pa. 1982). Adequate protection should not and cannot be illusory and still pass  
4 muster. *See In re LTAP US, LLLP*, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 667 at \*9 (Bankr. D. Del.  
5 Feb. 18, 2011) (a grant of replacement liens on assets already subject to a secured  
6 party’s liens is not adequate protection). The Financing Motion should be denied  
7 absent the Lenders’ consent. *See* 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 364.05 (16th ed.,  
8 2018).

9  
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11  
12 As set forth below, the Lenders are willing to consent to tailored interim relief  
13 on the Financing Motion that maintains the *status quo*, and that permits the parties  
14 time to evaluate the issues that surround the Financing Motion in advance of any  
15 further interim hearing or any final hearing. While the Lenders believe that even the  
16 terms described below will not meet the technical requirements of the Bankruptcy  
17 Code, the Debtors should be required to provide the adequate protection that is  
18 possible, while the parties continue to assess the path forward in the Chapter 11  
19 Cases.

20  
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22  
23 **D. The Debtors Have Not Appropriately Shopped The Proposed Loan**

24 The Court should limit relief on the Financing Motion beyond what is  
25 necessary pay operating costs on an interim basis and pending further proceedings,  
26

1 since there is no evidence the Proposed Loan is the product of any real effort to  
2 obtain appropriate terms.  
3

4 Before the Court can approve secured debtor in possession borrowing in the  
5 Chapter 11 Cases, the Debtors must establish they are unable to obtain financing on  
6 less onerous terms. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c), (d); *see also In re Los Angeles*  
7 *Dodgers, LLC*, 457 B.R. 308, 312 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (denying request to obtain  
8 financing, “premised upon Section 364(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §  
9 364(b), which explicitly precludes the [loan] where, as here, Debtors are unable to  
10 prove that they are ‘unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable under section  
11 503(b)(1) . . . as an administrative expense’”); *In re Seth Co., Inc.* 281 B.R. 150, 153  
12 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002) (section 364(d) financing requires that the debtor be unable  
13 to otherwise obtain credit); *Aqua Assoc.*, 123 B.R. at 195-196 (financing should not  
14 be approved when funds are available from some other source); *Crouse Group*, 71  
15 B.R. at 549.  
16  
17  
18  
19

20 These standards mean that postpetition financing should not be approved if  
21 there was not an adequate effort to obtain alternative financing. *Plabell Rubber*  
22 *Products, Inc.*, 137 B.R. at 990 (contact with one other bank insufficient); *In re*  
23 *Reading Tube Industries*, 72 B.R. 329, 332 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (denying approval  
24 of DIP financing where debtor put on no evidence of its efforts to seek alternatives;  
25  
26

1 *In re Crouse*, 71 B.R. at 550 (Section 364(c) requires debtor to demonstrate  
2 “combination of clear findings on the necessity of the funds, an absence of  
3 alternatives, and a weighing of the wisdom of the funding agreements;” debtors who  
4 approached only one lending institution for DIP financing failed to show “the  
5 requisite exhaustive unsuccessful efforts to obtain credit”).  
6  
7

8 The Debtors have not carried their burden on these issues in the Financing  
9 Motion. The Debtors instead make unsupported assertions that the proposed  
10 financing is the result of a “wide ranging market exploration” by the Debtors and  
11 their professionals. *See Lane Declaration ¶ 21*. The Debtors concede that this “wide  
12 ranging” effort was actually narrow, involving (perhaps) six financial institutions,  
13 including the Agent. *Id.*  
14  
15

16 There is significant reason to question whether there was any meaningful  
17 Debtor-outreach beyond the proposed lender under the Financing Motion. The  
18 Debtors’ outreach to the Agent, for example, was cursory and seemingly designed  
19 to fail. The Agent made clear in multiple statements that it was willing to consider  
20 financing for the Chapter 11 Cases, but needed updated cash flow projections and  
21 similar materials to assess the viability of such a loan and the terms thereof. Despite  
22 multiple requests for this information over a month-long effort, if not longer, no  
23 information was provided until after the Debtors selected the DIP Lender as their  
24  
25  
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1 preferred partner. The information that was then given was incomplete and did not  
2 provide the Agent sufficient information to make an informed investment decision.  
3

4 Given the extremely costly terms for the Proposed Loan, these concerns are  
5 hardly academic. The Debtors must conduct a truly “wide ranging” effort to obtain  
6 financing before anything beyond minimal interim relief is allowed.  
7

8 **E. The Lenders Will Consent To Interim Relief On Appropriate Terms**

9 For now, the Lenders are willing to consent to tailored interim relief on the  
10 Financing Motion that maintains the *status quo*, and that permits the parties time to  
11 evaluate the issues that surround the Financing Motion in advance of any further  
12 interim hearing or any final hearing. For purposes of the initial hearing on the  
13 Financing Motion, the Lenders are specifically willing to consent to relief with the  
14 following attributes:  
15  
16

- 17 • Limited borrowing under an agreed short term budget to support  
18 postpetition ordinary course operating costs pending a further interim  
19 or final hearing;
- 20 • An agreement (or requirement) to defer any borrowing under the  
21 Proposed Loan or other relief to repay any prepetition secured funded  
22 debt at this time;
- 23 • Adequate protection terms that are customary in hospital chapter 11  
24 cases and are necessary given the Debtors’ planned priming of the  
25 Lenders liens in and Debtors’ use of the Bond Collateral and Working  
26 Capital Loan Collateral;

- A good faith commitment by the Lenders and Debtors to discuss the go-forward process in the Chapter 11 Cases before the next hearing on the Financing Motion; and
- A full reservation of all rights of the Lenders and Debtors as to the Financing Motion and the Proposed Loan of any unresolved positions pending a further interim hearing or final hearing on the Financing Motion.

The proposed terms on which the Lenders are willing to consent to this interim relief are reflected in the attached **Schedule A**. Any other relief on the Financing Motion should be denied at this stage.

### **RESERVATION OF RIGHTS**

As noted, this is an initial objection to the Financing Motion in the context of the Debtors' anticipated "first day" hearing. The Lenders continue to evaluate what further interim or final relief on the Financing Motion may be appropriate, whether other relief is more appropriate, and reserve all rights in connection with those matters. For the avoidance of doubt, the Lenders reserve all rights to file further objections to the Financing Motion on any matters that may be relevant to the requested relief, whether or not those issues are described in this initial objection. The Lenders similarly reserve all rights to amend or supplement this objection, whether in connection with the Debtors' request for any interim or final relief or otherwise.

1 CONCLUSION

2 WHEREFORE, the Lenders request that the Court (i) condition and otherwise  
3  
4 limit relief on the Financing Motion for the reasons and in the manner set forth  
5 above; (ii) deny any aspect of the Financing Motion that forms the basis for the  
6 objections stated herein; (iii) modify any proposed order granting any relief on the  
7 Financing Motion to conform to the objections stated herein; and (iv) grant such  
8 further relief as the Court deems appropriate.  
9

10 [signatures follow]  
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1  
2  
3 DATED this 7th day of May, 2019.

4 MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN LLP

5 /s/ Mark D. Northrup

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11 *trustee and Lapis Advisers LP as agent*

12 and

13 William W. Kannel (*Pro Hac* Application to  
14 be Filed)

15 Ian A. Hammel (*Pro Hac* Application to be  
16 Filed)

17 Timothy J. McKeon (*Pro Hac* Application  
18 to be Filed)

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**Schedule A**  
**(Interim Order Terms)**

(a) A commitment to negotiate an “all options” strategy immediately and with agreed milestones, including efforts to pursue a sale of the Debtors’ acute care hospitals or merger, and a refinancing of all amounts owed to the Lenders, in addition to the Debtors’ preferred standalone path.

(b) A prohibition on any use of the DIP Facility to pay off Banner or MidCap pending a further hearing.

(c) A full reservation of all rights of the Lenders and Debtors as to the Financing Motion and the Proposed Loan for any unresolved positions pending a further interim hearing or final hearing on the Financing Motion.

(d) Replacement liens (which shall be automatically perfected) and superpriority claims on all assets of the Debtors and their estates, subject only to a reasonable carve out and reasonable post petition DIP facility.

(e) Compliance by the Debtors at all times with a budget approved in advance by the Lenders.

(f) Allowance of the Lenders’ Bond Claims and Working Capital Loan Claims, effective upon a final order and subject to the Committee investigation and challenge period proposed below. Subject to this same investigation and challenge period, effective upon a final order, typical cash collateral order releases from the Debtors.

(g) Reporting in the form of the same reporting contemplated by the DIP Facility and with rights to other information as reasonably requested.

(h) Compliance with existing Bond and Working Capital Loan documents relating to the maintenance and insurance of the Debtors’ assets and financial reporting, as well as, pursuant to the Bond Documents, the tax exemption for the Bonds.

(i) A prohibition on the use of Bond Collateral, Working Capital Loan Collateral, DIP facility proceeds or other cash to challenge the Bond Claims, the Working Capital Loan Claims, the Lenders’ collateral or otherwise pursue claims against the Lenders, subject to a customary committee investigation budget.

1 (j) A customary limited committee challenge period (75 days from  
2 the petition date).

3 (k) A customary limited carve out acceptable to the Lenders.

4 (l) Customary 506(c) and 552 waivers effective upon a final order.

5 (m) Customary termination events if there is a material adverse  
6 change or non compliance by the Debtors.

7 (n) Customary good faith protections for the Lenders in case any  
8 order providing the Lenders' relief on the foregoing matters is later modified or  
9 revoked.

10 (o) Customary rights recognizing the Lenders' rights to credit bid in  
11 any sale of the Debtors' assets.

12 (p) Customary relief from stay to permit the Lenders to take action  
13 authorized by the order.

14 (q) Customary provisions making the relief binding on successors,  
15 including any bankruptcy trustee.

16 (r) A customary reservation of Lenders' rights to seek further relief.

17 (s) Monthly adequate protection payments in the amount of  
18 monthly interest accrued on the principal amount of the Bonds and the  
19 Working Capital Loan at non-default rates.  
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